Dispatch

Phil Ivey vs Crockfords: The 7.7M Pound Baccarat Case

Doug Reilly/
Featured image for Phil Ivey vs Crockfords: The 7.7M Pound Baccarat Case
Share /

Phil Ivey arrived at Crockfords in Mayfair on a Thursday evening in September 2012. He had been playing poker professionally for a decade. He was worth tens of millions. He came to the baccarat table alone, except for a companion who would sit beside him and direct his play (a legal form of assistance in London casinos).

He left three days later with 7.7 million pounds. The casino suspected cheating. They refused to pay.

What happened in those three days became a legal case that would take five years and wind through two UK court systems. Phil Ivey v. Crockfords Limited. The case hinged on a single, obscure detail: the orientation of printing on the cards.

The Setup

Baccarat is one of the simplest games in a casino. Two hands are dealt: the banker and the player. One of them will win. There are three possible outcomes: player win, banker win, tie. The player position is somewhat illusory; you are not playing against the dealer, you are betting on which hand will win. The game has almost no decisions. You bet, the cards are dealt, the outcome is determined. House edge on banker bets is about 1%, on player bets about 1.06%. It is one of the lowest house edges in the casino.

What made Crockfords significant is that they used card shoes manufactured by a particular supplier. This supplier had a flaw in their card printing. The print on the card back was slightly asymmetrical. The symmetry line was off by a fraction of a millimeter, but if you knew to look for it, and if you had extremely keen eyesight, you could detect a very subtle visual difference between certain card backs depending on the card's orientation.

Ivey and his companion exploited this. They identified high-value cards (aces and eights in baccarat, which determine winning hands) by their back patterns. They then requested that the shoe be placed in a particular orientation, citing superstition. The casino obliged. With the shoe positioned correctly, they could identify roughly 50% of the cards in the shoe. In baccarat, this is a massive advantage. The house edge becomes a player edge of roughly 6-7%.

Over three days, Ivey and his companion played 329 shoes of baccarat. They won 7.7 million pounds.

Crockfords called him the next day. "We are not paying," a manager said. "We believe you cheated."

The Trial

Ivey argued he did nothing illegal. He used information from the cards themselves. He did not mark the cards, he did not bring external devices, he did not manipulate the game. He read the game. Crockfords argued he exploited a defect in their equipment without disclosure. They claimed he engaged in fraud.

In 2014, the case went to trial. The court examined the card backs under magnification. The defect was real. The asymmetry was visible to a trained eye. But was using it cheating?

The judge ruled against Ivey. The court found that Ivey had engaged in "cheating at play" even though he had not violated the technical rules of the game. The finding was narrow: Ivey had deliberately exploited a known defect in the casino's equipment, gained knowledge from that exploitation, and used it for financial gain. Even if legal rules were not technically broken, the intent was deceptive. The casino did not owe him the money.

Ivey appealed. The appeals court in 2016 upheld the decision. The highest court in the UK (the Supreme Court) heard the case in 2017. Lord Neuberger, sitting in judgment, delivered the opinion: Ivey had not cheated. The cards themselves were the source of information. Using that information was not deceptive. If Crockfords had defective cards, that was their problem, not Ivey's.

The Supreme Court ruled 3-2 in Ivey's favor. He was owed 7.7 million pounds plus interest.

The Aftermath

Crockfords paid, with substantial resentment. The case became a watershed moment in casino law. The ruling was clear: using publicly available information (even information from a defect in casino equipment) is not cheating. The responsibility for game integrity lies with the operator, not the player.

The practical effect was immediate. Every casino in the UK and Europe began ordering new cards from new suppliers. Card manufacturers redesigned their printing processes. Within six months, cards with asymmetrical backs had vanished from the industry.

Ivey's reputation shifted. He was celebrated by poker players as a genius. He was vilified in casinos as a hustler. The truth was somewhere between: he had identified a weakness and exploited it. The law said that was not illegal. The casino's equipment had failed. The casino's surveillance had missed it. The casino's responsibility.

What makes this case essential to understand is that it establishes a bright line in casino law: the player's obligation is only to follow the rules as written. The casino's obligation is to maintain game integrity. A defective card is a failure of game integrity. A player who notices and uses that defect is engaging in advantage play, not cheating. One is legal. The other is not.

Phil Ivey sat at that baccarat table in Mayfair and made 7.7 million pounds by paying attention to the details no one else noticed. The court decided he had earned it.